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ASSESSMENT OF TSUNAMI RISK TO AN OIL REFINERY IN 
SOUTHERN ITALY 
 
ABSTRACT 
Industrial facilities located in coastal areas subject to tsunami hazards may be at risk of tsunami 
impact and damage. Furthermore, if hazardous materials are present these can be accidentally 
released impacting nearby residents and dispersing into the environment. In this report we present 
the results of a study which analyzed the potential impact of two tsunamis originating in the 
Tyrrhenian Sea and their consequences at an industrial facility located on the coast in north-
eastern Sicily. The results of the tsunami simulations indicate that in both scenarios there would 
be eighteen storage tanks (of 43 located within 400 m from the shoreline) at the industrial facility 
subject to flooding, with tanks closer to the shoreline suffering up to 0.8 m inundation. Flow 
velocities in most areas are less than 1 m/s. This indicates that any damage would occur due to 
hydrostatic uplift forces due to buoyancy particularly in the western part of the facility where 
inundation levels are higher and storage tanks are less protected. Potential damage caused by 
impact of floating debris may be a problem in an area near the shoreline just west of a pumping 
station and warehouse (central section of the refinery near the shoreline) due to high flow 
velocities (3-4 m/s) in both tsunami scenarios. Foundation soils and foundation systems could 
also be at risk from shear- and liquefaction-induced scour in this section of the plant. The 
likelihood for hazardous materials releases from inundated storage tanks is low but could occur 
due to breakage of connected pipelines and flanges due to buoyancy, or due to floating off of 
almost empty storage tanks and connected pipelines. Flooding of electrical equipment, such as 
control panels, pumps, and motors not raised above the inundation level could result in salt water 
intrusion leading to possible short circuit, hampering of safety and mitigation systems, process 
upsets and possible hazardous materials releases. We conclude however that in the two scenarios 
studied, the consequences of potential hazardous materials releases, fires or explosions triggered 
by the tsunamis on nearby residents and neighbouring facilities are likely to be small. 
Nevertheless, we make recommendations for preventive and preparedness measures that can be 
taken to reduce the risk of tsunami-triggered Natech accidents and to mitigate their consequences 
if they do occur. 
 1
1. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial facilities located in coastal areas subject to tsunami hazards may be at risk of tsunami 
impact and damage. Furthermore, if hazardous materials are present these can be accidentally 
released and dispersed into the environment. The oil refinery fires triggered by the 1964 Niigata 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan serve as an example of the potentially catastrophic effects of a 
tsunami when it affects a highly industrialized and urbanized area. During this event, a 4 m 
tsunami was triggered by the 7.5 magnitude earthquake which initially caused fires in five storage 
tanks and oil spills in hundreds more at two oil refineries in Niigata (Iwabuchi et al. 2006). The 
tsunami hit the already earthquake stricken facility resulting in: 
o additional damage to storage tanks and plant processing equipment by collision with 
tsunami-driven objects and by the hydrodynamic forces of the tsunami (Iwabuchi et al. 
2006). 
o the spread of leaked oil by the tsunami current into the harbor and on inundated land 
(Iwabuchi et al. 2006).  
o the spread of burning crude oil carried by the flood waters causing the fires to extend to 
other parts of the plant including the heating furnace, the heat recovery boiler, the reactor 
of the catalytic conversion process, the hydrolysis treatment equipment, and the bottom of 
the hydrolysis reactor for the desulphurization process (Akatsuka and Kobayashi 2008).  
o the spread of ignited crude oil carried by the flood waters into residential areas and the 
destruction of 286 houses by the fire (Iwabuchi et al. 2006, Akatsuka and Kobayashi 
2008). 
The recent Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004 illustrates the vulnerability of industrial 
plants when located in coastal areas; although fortunately most of the areas affected by the 
tsunami were not heavily industrialized. Nevertheless, the few manufacturing sites that were 
impacted were severely damaged and hazardous-materials releases did occur. For example, in the 
city of Banda Aceh, where flood heights reached 9 m (Borrero 2005), two depots of fertilizer and 
pesticide and an oil retail facility located at the harbour were completely destroyed by the 
tsunami. Spilled oils and other materials from the damaged facilities dispersed completely into 
the environment (Van Dijk 2007). Similar tsunami effects were documented at Krueng Raya 
Harbour and Meuloboh. In Krueng Raya Harbour, where water flood heights were observed at 5 
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m (Borrero 2005), three of eight oil storage tanks were displaced and their contents lost at an oil 
storage depot. One of the tanks was found empty at a nearby village. At another oil storage 
facility at Meulaboh, three of four tanks were moved and the contents of the tanks dispersed. At 
both locations, Van Dijk (2007) reports the contents of the tanks were washed away and diluted 
into the sea with little trace. The author documented however a substantial number of filled 
barrels and some oil slicks at several places in Krueng Raya and as far as 2 km from the harbour. 
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004, the third largest natural disaster in recorded 
human history and the largest to be caused by sea waves (Levy and Gopalakrishnan, 2005), 
caught many countries by surprise, particularly those that considered their territories tsunami risk 
free. Following the tragic event, many resources and efforts around the world have been spent on 
improved tsunami hazard identification and mapping, tsunami vulnerability assessment, tsunami 
risk assessment and management, and introduction of tsunami hazard reduction methods 
including improved warning systems (Dareinzo et al. 2005; Jonientz-Triesler et al. 2005; Lorito 
et al. 2008).  
Within this framework the Tsunami Risk and Strategies for the European Region (TRANSFER) 
project, co-funded under the European Commission’s 6th Framework Programme, researches the 
tsunami risk in Europe by focusing on several geographically different tsunami-prone regions. In 
the frame of and funded by the TRANSFER project, the Major Accident Hazards Bureau at the 
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in Ispra, Italy, has analyzed the potential 
consequences of tsunami impact on an industrial facility which houses and processes hazardous 
materials. The work focused on the north eastern coast of Sicily, which has been identified as a 
tsunami-prone region under the TRANSFER project. Two credible tsunami source scenarios 
were selected and modelled, and the potential for damage and hazardous-materials releases 
resulting from the tsunami impacts to an industrial facility located in this area were assessed. 
Moreover, recommendations for tsunami risk reduction are made. This report describes the 
results of our study and constitutes part of Deliverable 8.4 of the TRANSFER project. 
 
2. TSUNAMIS 
A tsunami is a sea wave of local or distant origin that results from large-scale water-body 
displacements associated with large earthquakes, major submarine slides, or large volcanic 
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eruptions. It is characterized as a shallow-water wave and differs from wind-generated waves in 
its period and wavelength. A tsunami can have a period of 5 minutes to 2 hours, and a 
wavelength in excess of 500km. Wind-generated waves usually have periods of 5-20 seconds, 
and a wavelength of 100-200 meters (Anderson 2007).  
Tsunami waves travel across deep waters at very high speed and are almost imperceptible, but 
slow down as they reach the coast growing in size. The speed of a shallow-water wave is equal to 
the square-root of the product of the acceleration of gravity and the depth of the water. The rate at 
which a wave loses its energy is inversely related to its wavelength. Therefore, because a tsunami 
has a large wavelength, it will lose little energy as it propagates. Thus, in deep water a tsunami 
will travel at high speeds propagating across long distances with little energy loss. When it enters 
more shallow waters near the coast, it undergoes a transformation. Since the speed of the tsunami 
is related to the water depth, as the depth of the water decreases, so does the speed. However, the 
total energy remains almost constant. This results in the growing of the height of the wave as it 
approaches the coastline (Anderson 2007). Because of this “shoaling” effect, a tsunami may grow 
to be a meter or more in height.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Definition of tsunami inundation terms (adapted from Anderson 2007). 
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Local bathymetry, undersea features, and the slope at the beach modify the tsunami as it 
approaches the shore and the effects at the shoreline can change considerably within very short 
distances. Thus, tsunami characteristics and behaviour at the shore are very difficult to predict 
(Yen, Robertson, and Preuss 2005). See figure 1 for a definition of tsunami inundation terms. 
Generally, run-up heights tend to be greatest near where the offshore bathymetry is steeper. 
Furthermore, if a tsunami approaches the coast during astronomical high tides the run-up heights 
may be even greater. 
 
3. TSUNAMI HAZARDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA AFFECTING SOUTHERN 
ITALY 
Tsunamis in the Mediterranean Sea are associated to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and 
landslides. The Mediterranean Sea basin is characterized by high seismicity and volcanic activity 
due to the active lithospheric plate convergence. Furthermore, due to its steep terrain, coastal and 
submarine landslides are frequent (Papadopoulos and Fokaefs 2005).  
Tsunamis in the Mediterranean Sea, although less frequent than those in the Pacific or Indian 
oceans, have caused extensive damage and loss of life (Lorito et al. 2008). There are historical 
accounts of major tsunamis following large earthquakes such as the M>8 near Crete in 365 AD 
and 1303; and M>7 in 1222 near Cyprus (Lorito et al. 2008). Devastating tsunamis occurred 
following earthquakes of M=6.9 and M=7.2 in 1783 and 1908, respectively, in the Messina 
Straights in Italy (Papadopoulos and Fokaefs 2005). 
Catalogues of tsunamis affecting European seas have been put together since the 1960s. The most 
updated tsunami catalogues for the Mediterranean Sea are those of Papadopoulos (2002, 2003) 
for Greece and surrounding regions, including the Marmara Sea, and Tinti et al. (2004) for the 
Italian region and the Côte d’Azur (Papadopoulos and Fokaefs 2005).   
The updated Italian tsunami catalogue by Tinti et al. (2004) covers the period between 79 AD and 
the present. It incorporates a detailed revision and evaluation of the original sources of data, 
integrating and updating a tsunami catalogue published by Tinti and Maramai in 1996. The 
updated catalogue contains data for 67 tsunamis affecting the Italian seas. More than 50% of 
these affected Southern Italy.  
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3.1 Earthquake associated tsunamis 
Lorito et al. (2008) studied earthquake-related tsunami hazards in Southern Italy. The authors 
focused on three tsunamigenic source zones: the Tell system in the Algeria-Tunisia offshore 
capable of generating earthquakes up to magnitude 7.0, the southern Tyrrhenian Sea thrust 
system capable of triggering earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 and higher, and the Hellenic Arc 
proven to be capable of generating frequent and occasionally very large earthquakes of 
magnitude >8.0, respectively located at short, intermediate and large distances from the coasts of 
southern Italy (see figure 2 from Lorito et al. (2008)). 
For each zone, Lorito et al. identified possible earthquake-related scenarios leading to tsunami. 
For each scenario they determined the maximum wave heights expected, the average and 
standard deviation estimates of the maximum wave height due to the set of scenarios pertaining 
to each zone, and the tsunami travel time maps for each of the investigated tsunamigenic source 
zones. 
The results of Lorito et al. indicate that the greatest threat to southern Italy would come from 
earthquakes along the Hellenic Arc source zone. Waves with average maximum height of 1 m or 
higher are expected along most of southern and eastern Sicily (from Trapani to Messina) and the 
south-eastern coasts of the southern Italy peninsula (from Reggio Calabria to Cantanzaro, Taranto, 
Brindisi and almost Bari). Furthermore, Lorito et al. found that extreme wave height values of 4 
m are very common all along the south-eastern coast of peninsular southern Italy. Travel time for 
waves reaching southern Italy and the south-eastern coasts of Sicily would be between 60-70 min. 
Lorito et al. determined that earthquakes along the southern Tyrrhenian source zone could 
produce low energy tsunamis. They estimated the average maximum wave height is around 0.2 m. 
Waves of 0.5 m and higher would affect only few localities around the northern coast of Sicily 
such as Palermo, Trapani, and Milazzo. Their results indicated that average wave travel times to 
these locations would vary between 5-10 min. 
The Algeria-Tunisia offshore source zone can generate tsunamis that would have a greater impact 
on the coasts of Sardinia. Nevertheless, Lorito et al. found that the western coast of Sicily (from 
Cinisi to Sciacca, and between Trapani and Marsala) would be affected by maximum wave 
heights in the order of 0.5 m. Wave travel times are in the order of 40-50 min. 
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 Figure 2. Tectonic sketch map of the Mediterranean basin. Instrumental seismicity (yellow dots; m>4; 
depth 0-50 km) is taken from the ISC Catalogue (ISC 2004). Color-shaded ribbons highlight the main 
structures capable of generating tsunamis that pose significant hazard to Mediterranean shore-facing 
settlements (shown in blue or red. Those shown in red have been investigated in this work). Selected 
earthquakes are shown with circles: 1) el Asnam, 1980; 2) Boumerdes, 2003; 3) Crete, 365 AD; 4) 
Palermo, 2002; 5) Northern Sicily, 1823; 6) Messina Straits, 1908.
 
3.2 Volcano, submarine and land slide associated tsunamis 
Tsunami waves resulting from volcanic eruptions, volcano-associated submarine slides and 
landslides, and mass failure (submarine and land slides) have historically affected the coasts of 
Italy. These have originated mainly in the Campagna and the Aeolian Islands regions of the 
country. Approximately, 18 % percent of the tsunamis in the new catalogue of Italian tsunamis 
(Tinti et al. 2004) are volcano associated; less than 3 % are due to mass failure.  
Interestingly, the first tsunami in the new Italian tsunami catalogue was generated by the large 
Plinian eruption of Vesuvius (in Campagna, Italy) in 79 AD, and resulted in the destruction of 
Pompei and other Roman villages (Tinti et al. 2004). One recent example occurred in December 
2002 following a phase of explosive activity of the Stromboli volcano. The tsunami was caused 
by a massive submarine landslide followed by a subaerial landslide from an elevation of 650 m 
above sea level on the northwest slope of Stromboli Island (Maramai et al. 2005). Tsunami waves 
as high as 8-10 m were recorded in Stromboli, and smaller waves were observed as far as 170 km 
at Mondello, northern Sicily and on the island of Ustica.  
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 4. VULNERABILITY OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES TO TSUNAMI IMPACT  
Tsunami and consequent floodwaters can impose different loads on industrial facility buildings 
and equipment. These include (Yeh, Robertson, and Preuss 2005):  
• Hydrostatic loads, which occur when standing or slowly moving water encounters 
buildings or a building component. Hydrostatic loads act laterally on an object and always 
act perpendicular to the surface to which it is applied. It is caused by an imbalance of 
pressure due to a differential water depth on opposite sides of a structure. Hydrostatic 
loads increase as the depth of water increases. 
• Buoyant loads or vertical hydrostatic loads, which act vertically through the centre of 
mass of a displaced volume on partially or totally submerged components. 
• Hydrodynamic loads, which result from moving water. These loads are a function of 
water flow velocity and structure geometry. They are induced by the flow of water 
moving at moderate to high velocity. 
• Surge loads, which are caused by the leading edge of a surge of water impinging on a 
structure 
• Breaking wave loads, particularly waves breaking on small-diameter vertical elements 
(e.g., piles, columns in the foundation of a building or a storage tank), and waves breaking 
against walls (e.g., breakaway wall, sea wall). 
• Impact loading, which results from floating debris such as wood, small boats, portions of 
houses, vehicles, containers, etc. striking a building, a building component, or equipment. 
However, there is little guidance on how industrial facilities can prevent or mitigate tsunami 
effects. Current structural design codes focus on loadings due to riverine floods and storm waves; 
providing little guidance for loads specifically induced by tsunami effects on coastal structures 
(Yeh, Robertson, and Preuss 2005). 
This is in part because there is scant empirical data that relates the various damage states (light, 
moderate, severe, complete) of industrial equipment versus flood water depths and water flow 
velocities. Furthermore, there are no specific methodologies available to carry out vulnerability 
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and risk assessments of tsunami impact to industrial facilities (Campedel, Antonioni, and Cozzani 
2008). 
 
5. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Based on tsunami source data for two credible tsunami scenarios provided by the TRANSFER 
project partners at the University of Bolognia, tsunami flow velocities and run-up heights along 
the north eastern Sicily coast were modelled by the JRC with the in-house model HyFlux2 
(Franchello 2008a, Franchello 2008b, Franchello and Krausmann, 2008). The numerical model 
was run with a nested grid system: running with a grid size of 400m x 400m in the abyssal plain, 
100mx100m in the continental shelf, a smaller grid size (20m x 20m) near the shore, and a fine 
grid size (5m x 5m) in the run-up zone. The two scenarios were a) an earthquake along the Capo 
Vaticano fault in Calabria and b) a land-slide at Stromboli. For the scenario a) the source data 
provided by the partners were the velocity and water surface elevation fields at 100 s, calculated 
by a finite element model while for the scenario b) the water surface elevation at 0 sec was 
provided by the University of Bologna. 
Data collected for the simulations included digital elevation model (DEM) data at a 100m x 100m 
grid level (SRTM DTED, 3 arc sec), bathymetry data in the far field at a 1000m x 1000m grid 
level (SRTM30_plus, 30 arc sec), and in the near field vector data corresponding to isolines - 
digitalized from a nautical map - for the north eastern coast of Sicily. Isolines were also 
digitalized for the specific area where a refinery is located, assuming a constant upward slope 
from the shoreline (0 m) to the railroad tracks that cross the refinery from west to east. Figure 3 
presents a map of the digital elevation model used (DEM) for the study region in the near field.  
ArcGIS was used to store, retrieve and analyze data and maps. 
Data about the industrial facility1 located in the study area was obtained from previous work 
carried out by Giardina (2000) and through review of safety reports and other pertinent 
documents. Data on location of processing units, warehouses, and storage tanks including 
substances stored in them were taken from Giardina. This data was compared with recent satellite 
images of the industrial facility obtained from Google-Earth. Storage tank dimensions and 
maximum storage quantities were estimated based on measurements taken from the Google-Earth 
                                                 
1The names of the refinery and other neighbouring facilities, as well as the name of the town where they are located,  
are not disclosed to protect their identities. 
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satellite image of the refinery using typical height to diameter ratios for large atmospheric storage 
tanks, and assuming tanks were filled to 75% capacity (Austin 1988; Sinnott 1989). The 
refinery’s official website was also reviewed. Data on total number of storage tanks and quantity 
of chemicals stored and processed reported on the refinery’s website was used to check the 
accuracy of the estimated tank dimensions. 
 
  
Figure 3. Map of DEM data for the study region. Red dots indicate the location of storage tanks within 
400 m from the shoreline. 
 
The weight of each tank was estimated in order to determine buoyancy of empty tanks subject to 
flooding. In general, weight loads considered for design purposes include vessel shell, vessel 
fittings (e.g., manways and nozzles), internal fittings (e.g., plates, heating and cooling coils), 
external fittings (e.g., ladders, platforms), auxiliary equipment which is not self supported (e.g., 
condensers, agitators), insulation, and the weight of the liquid to fill the vessel (Sinnott 1989). In 
this particular case we were interested in the total weight of the shell and fittings excluding the 
contents. The total weight of a steel cylindrical vessel with domed ends, and uniform wall 
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thickness excluding internal fittings such as plates can be calculated with equation (1) (Sinnott 
1989): 
 Wv = 240CvDm(Hv +0.8Dm)t                                         Eq. (1) 
where  
Cv = a factor to account for the weight of nozzles, manways, etc. 
Dm = mean diameter of vessel, m 
Hv = height, or length, m 
t = wall thickness, mm 
The tank wall thickness, t, required at depth HL of liquid can be estimated with equation (2) 
(Sinnott 1989):  
 t  = ρL*HL*g*Dt/(2*ft*J*1000)    Eq. (2) 
where  
HL = liquid depth, m 
ρL = liquid density, kg/m3 (should assume 1000 kg/m3) 
J = joint factor (if applicable) 
g = gravitational acceleration, 9.81 m/s2 
ft = design stress for tank material, N/mm (for carbon steel/ stainless steel the values range 
from 135 to 165) 
Dt = tank diameter, m 
Eq. (1) provides a good estimate of the weight of the tank. For the calculations the liquid depth 
was assumed to equal the tank height (estimated height from GoogleEarth). The mean diameter 
of the vessel was assumed to equal the estimated tank diameter (estimated diameter from 
GoogleEarth). In general when refinery specific data was not available, typical generic data for 
this type of facility was used for the calculations. 
Interviews with the industrial facility’s managers and engineers were requested. However, at the 
writing of this report, the interviews had not been granted. A field visit to the refinery was 
performed by colleagues from the JRC. The field visit was carried out in order to collect data on 
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altitudes (elevation above sea level) and latitude/longitude coordinates (with a hand held GPS) at 
various reference points to compare and validate topographic (DEM) data used for the tsunami 
inundation modelling. Furthermore, features that might influence tsunami wave propagation and 
inundation were documented. The field visit included data collection offsite and did not include 
an onsite visit as the refinery did not reply to our written request. 
The risk assessment methodology included hazard identification and characterization for the two 
tsunami scenarios proposed, determining exposure and vulnerability of the industrial facility 
components (mostly storage tanks near the shoreline) to the tsunamis.  
 
6. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS 
Two credible tsunami scenarios were developed and its impacts analyzed. Initial tsunami 
conditions for both scenarios were provided by the TRANSFER partners at the University of 
Bologna. The first scenario is a tsunami triggered by an Mw 7.0 earthquake along the Capo 
Vaticano fault near Calabria studied by Piatanesi and Tinti (2002). This fault line is believed to 
be the source of an earthquake and tsunami in Calabria on 8 September 1905 which devastated 
many towns and villages and resulted in more than 500 victims. The tsunami source conditions 
were provided in the form of an ANSI file containing data on longitude, latitude and wave 
amplitude in meters. The wave amplitudes were input into the in-house HyFlux2 model for the 
tsunami simulation. 
The second scenario is a tsunami triggered by a landslide at the Stromboli Volcano as studied by 
Tinti et al. (2003). Initial conditions were provided as an ANSI file containing 5 columns 
including longitude, latitude, x-component of the velocity, y-component of the velocity, and 
wave amplitude. The information provided by the University of Bologna was computed by means 
of a numerical model based on a Lagrangian approach (see Tinti et al. 2003 for a full description). 
The data provided was not indeed a pure initial condition, because the generation of a tsunami by 
a landslide is not an instantaneous process, but the forcing takes place over a finite time interval. 
The data provided represent the tsunami field at a time (100 s) after which it is reasonable to 
assume that the forcing due to the landslide is over and that what remains is the pure tsunami 
propagation. 
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The wave amplitude and velocity components were input into the HyFlux2 model for the tsunami 
propagation and run-up simulations.  Note that for the landslide scenario not only the wave 
amplitude but also the velocity components were input to the model. 
There are several large oil refineries located along the northern and southern coasts of Sicily, as 
well as in the southern peninsula of Italy, and they are therefore subject to tsunami hazards as 
was described in section 2. In this study we are interested in assessing the risk of tsunami impact 
to a refinery located in north-eastern Sicily as it would be exposed to tsunamis from these two 
scenarios.  
In the following sections we briefly describe the oil refinery and the critical target equipment. We 
discuss the development of each tsunami scenario, and for each scenario we analyze the tsunami 
wave propagation and its potential impact at an oil refinery along the north-eastern coast of Sicily. 
Based on the tsunami modelling results, we assess the potential damage and hazardous materials 
release that could result at the refinery.  
 
6.1 Description of the oil refinery 
The refinery of interest processes about 10 million tons of crude oil per year. The refinery 
produces gasoline and naphtha fuels, kerosene, propylene, gas and fuel oils, liquefied petroleum 
gas (LPG), and other hydrocarbons which serve as a prime materials for the petrochemical 
industry. 
The refinery consists of the following sections (see figure 4a and 4b):  
- Processing: atmospheric and vacuum distillation units, and catalytic reforming unit, 
hydrocracking unit and hydrodesulfurisation unit, among others. 
- Storage farm: 127 storage tanks with capacity of over 3.75 million m3 for prime materials, 
intermediate products and finished products. Figure 4c shows the main storage tanks at 
the refinery indicating a tank identification (ID) number. 
- Port terminals: Two jetties used for loading and unloading tankers of up to 420,000 DWT 
(Dead Weight Tonnage). The port terminals have a maximum crude oil reception rate 
capacity of 15,000 tons per hour. It moves about 570 ships per year (max. capacity is 900 
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ships/yr). Through the two port terminals it moves approximately 12 million tons per year 
of crude oil and other products. 
- Utilities: such as boilers, cooling towers, and process air. 
- Mitigation systems: for atmospheric and marine pollution. 
 
6.1.1 Topography 
The refinery occupies an area of about 2 km2. It is located along a stretch of coast line about 1.5-
1.7 km from west to east along the eastern part of a bay. It is bounded by residential areas on its 
western end and along the western and south western edges. The distance from the shoreline to 
the refinery fence line in the western most tip of the refinery is about 80 m at an elevation of 1-
1.5 m. The western end of the refinery on the shoreline is flat, and in fact the storage tanks and 
other equipment that are visible across the fence line are slightly below this level. See figures 5 
and 6. 
The eastern end of the refinery on the shoreline and the eastern sides are bounded by a power 
plant. The south-eastern corner is bounded by a small road and a highway. The southern part of 
the refinery is bounded by a small road, becoming residential towards the west. The distance 
between the shoreline and the refinery fence line at the eastern end is about 20 m, at an elevation 
of 2-2.5 m. Some soil erosion and scouring along the refinery fence line was noted on the eastern 
end (see figures 7 and 8). At the south eastern corner (point inland) of the refinery we estimated 
the elevation to be about 12-18 m. At the area where the railroad tracks cross over to the 
neighbouring power plant we estimated the altitude to be about 8-15 m. Figure 9 summarizes the 
observed distances and elevations at various points around the refinery. 
The field observations from outside the fence line of the refinery indicated that the DEM data 
used for the tsunami modelling sufficiently approximates the elevations near the rail road tracks 
but was less accurate in representing elevations near the shoreline. This undoubtedly adds 
uncertainty to the tsunami modelling results. Nonetheless, the DEM data used was the best data 
available for the simulations. 
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6.1.2 Storage tanks and tsunami protection measures 
There are over 30 large storage tanks less than 200 m from the coastline at the refinery. Other 
features located on or near the coastline include the refinery’s two port terminals (see item no. 10 
in figure 9), a warehouse, pumping station and 3 water storage tanks (item no. 9 in figure 9), and 
parts of the distillation unit (item no. 11 in figure 9).  
The storage tanks on the eastern side (both near the shoreline and towards the southern end) of 
the refinery (tank ID 52-58), used for crude oil storage, all have earthen containment dikes of 3-4 
m in height (see figures 10 and 11). Storage tanks on the western side of the plant (tank ID 0, 1, 
6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 18, 120, 121 and 31), used for storage of intermediates and finished product, 
appear to have 0.8-1m high brick and concrete walls. During the field visit, containment walls or 
dikes were only partially visible from our vintage point outside the refinery. We assume that the 
walls are present around all storage tanks as this is general practice (see figures 12 and 13). 
At the shoreline there are no visible tsunami protection measures such as break walls, or other 
type of barriers. On the eastern end there is a natural earthen barrier about 4-5 m in height, 2-3 m 
in width, and about 30-40 m in length. However, it has been dug into to allow for placement of 
piping and other equipment. Thus it would provide little flood protection. It could however 
provide some protection from debris impact to the exposed pipelines. The earthen barrier has 
been subject to soil erosion (see figures 14 and 15). The fence surrounds the entire refinery. On 
the shoreline, the fence is supported by a small brick and concrete wall (0.5m x 0.15m, see 
figures 15 and 16), designed to keep intruders out, but not water. The support wall for the fence is 
no longer visible in some areas (due to sand dunning, see figures 15 and 16). The fence support 
wall on the southern and eastern sides of the refinery (inland) stands high, about 2m in height. 
 
6.1.3 Port terminals 
There are two port terminals that go into the sea to a distance of about 350-400 m. There were 
two large ships moored at each one at the time of the site visit. Loading arms were visible from 
the shoreline (figures 17 to 19). The port terminal area is open, without any break-walls, or 
natural features to protect the ships from wave action. 
 
 
 15
 
a) 
 
b)
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 c) 
Figure 4. a) Floor plan of the refinery (Giardina 2000); b) satellite image showing distribution of storage 
tanks; and c) storage tank identification (ID) numbers. 
 
6.1.4 Residential areas and other facilities 
There are residential areas neighbouring with the refinery on its western and south western sides. 
Any oil spills on the shoreline during a tsunami would likely be transported by wave action 
(water inundation) into a nearby port area and inundated residential areas to the west of the 
refinery (figures 20 to 23). On its eastern side the refinery is bordered by a power plant. The 
power plant is located about 30-40 m from the shoreline at an elevation of about 2-2.5m.  
However, it appears that several buildings and equipment at the power plant are below the 2m 
level. The land around the power plant was flat, with an increase in elevation to about 5-8 m at its 
southern end. There are no visible tsunami (or wave action) protection measures (see figures 24 
and 25). 
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Figure 5. View of the refinery shoreline at the western end. The refinery starts where the people are 
fishing. Distance between shoreline and refinery at this point is about 60-80 m. 
 
Figure 6. Fence at the shoreline indicating where the refinery shoreline begins. Elevation above sea level 
at horizontal fence line along the shoreline of the refinery is about 1-1.5 m. 
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Figure 7. View of the refinery along the eastern side facing the power plant. Distance from the shoreline to 
the refinery at this point is about 20 m, and elevation above sea level about 2-2.5 m. Some soil erosion and 
scouring along the refinery fence line was noted. 
 
Figure 8. View of shoreline from eastern tip of refinery looking towards the west. Notice distance from 
refinery fence line to shoreline contracts to about 10m. 
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 Figure 9. Satellite photo of the refinery. 1- Western end of the refinery at the shoreline, distance between 
water line and refinery fence line is approximately 60-80 m, elevation is 1-1.5 m. 2- Eastern end of the 
refinery at the shoreline, distance between water line and refinery fence line is approx. 20m, elevation is 
2-2.5 m. 3- Distance between water line and refinery fence line at this point is approximately 5-10 m, 
elevation is 1m. 4. Eastern side of the refinery neighbouring with the power plant, elevation is 5-8 m. 5- 
Eastern-south part of the refinery neighbouring with the power plant, elevation is 12-18 m.6- Warehouses 
and other small buildings neighbouring the refinery on the north western edge. Distance to the shoreline is 
approx 60-80 m and elevation 1-1.5 m. 7- Shoreline area in front of the power plant, distance to the 
shoreline is approx. 30-40 m, and elevation is 2-2.5 m. 8- Southern end of the refinery at the open canal. 
Elevation at this point is approx. 15-18 m. 9- Warehouse, pumping station, and 3 water storage tanks. 10. 
Refinery port terminals. 11- Distillation unit. 
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 Figure 10. Earthen dikes around these four storage tanks (in the background) located at the south eastern 
corner of the refinery. 
 
Figure 11. Refinery fence line along the eastern side of the refinery (neighboring with the power plant), 
and the 4m high earthen wall around a storage tank.  
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 Figure 12. Storage tank for finished product on western end of the refinery near the shore line. No earthen 
dikes around this tank.  
 
Figure 13. Storage tanks for finished product on western end of the refinery. Concrete containment dike is 
visible around tank no. 53 in this photo, and appears to be about 0.8-1 m in height. 
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 Figure 14. Front view of natural earthen barrier (approx. 4 -5m in height) at the eastern edge of the 
refinery at the shoreline. Some soil erosion is evident. 
 
Figure 15. Side view of the natural earthen barrier shown in figure 6. Soil erosion is evident from this 
photo as well as sand dunning over fence line.  
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 Figure 16. Refinery fence line along the shoreline. Notice that in some areas the fence support wall is no 
longer visible as it has been partly covered by sand. 
 
Figure 17. A ship docked at one of the port terminals (west) at the refinery. 
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 Figure 18. A ship docked at one of the port terminals (east) at the refinery. 
 
Figure 19. Loading arms are visible in this photograph at the port terminals of the refinery. 
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 Figure 20. Residential area on south-western side of the refinery. 
 
Figure 21. Beach and residential areas neighboring refinery on its western side. 
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 Figure 22. View of port area to the west of the refinery. 
 
Figure 23. Residential area (beach front property) near the western side of the refinery. Notice that road is 
at a slightly higher elevation than the homes in the background. Elevation here is about 1.5 m. 
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 Figure 24.View of neighbouring power plant to the east of the refinery. Distance from water line to power 
plant fence line is approximately 30-40 m, elevation is 2-2.5m. 
 
Figure 25. Beach front part of the power plant neighbouring with the refinery. 
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6.2 Earthquake-triggered tsunami 
The first scenario constructed for the study corresponds to a tsunami triggered by an Mw 7.0 
earthquake along the Capo Vaticano fault in the Bay of Saint Eufemia, Calabria, according to a 
study by Piatanesi and Tinti (2002) (figure 26). 
 
Aeolian Archipelago 
Calabria
Sicily
Figure 26. Initial conditions of the earthquake-triggered tsunami along the Capo Vaticano fault. Courtesy 
of the University of Bologna. Blue indicates water surface level below sea level, red indicates water 
surface level above sea level. 
Although the Capo Vaticano fault is about 75 km from the area of interest, the earthquake would 
be felt at in the north-eastern part of Sicily. Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) values in this area 
for the earthquake were estimated at VI-VII (Guidoboni et al. 2007) based on historical records 
of a similar earthquake in Calabria on 8 September 1905. Previous earthquake experience shows 
that the likelihood of moderate damage (e.g., failure of some connected pipelines, repairable 
damage to tank support systems; moderate likelihood of release of tank contents) at these MMI 
levels would be low, less than 5% according to tables published by Seligson et al. (1996). Thus, 
the facility would most likely experience no damage or just light damage such as slight 
movement of tanks from tank supports due to the earthquake forces. No hazardous materials 
releases would be expected from this earthquake.  
Using the initial conditions provided by University of Bologna, the results of our tsunami 
propagation modelling show that the earthquake would produce a large tsunami wave which 
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would propagate across the South-eastern Tyrrhenian region affecting Calabria, the Aeolian 
archipelago, and northern Sicily. The first positive wave would arrive the area of interest 
approximately after 27 min. The tsunami wave would be approaching the coastline laterally from 
east to west, impacting the port terminals perpendicularly. The maximum wave height at the port 
terminals would be about 1.2 m above normal tide; with about a 2-2.5 m differential between the 
wave crest and trough.  
The maximum water surface level at the shoreline of the refinery would vary between 1m and 1.2 
m (see figure 28a). The water flow velocity at the shoreline would vary between 0.5 m/s to 4 m/s. 
The area immediately to the west of the warehouse and pump station would experience the 
highest water flow velocities (see figure 29a). In general the western half of the refinery 
experiences higher water flow velocities than the eastern half. 
The distance to the sea of the maximum water run-up is estimated at about 140m; the area 
between the two port terminals would be inundated the greatest distance inland (see figure 30a). 
This area would also suffer the highest water run-up (see figure 31a). In general the western half 
of the refinery would experience greater run up heights, between 1.2m - 1.30m, than the eastern 
end, which would be subject to maximum run up heights of 1m - 1.2m. 
There would be eighteen large storage tanks subject to flooding. Figure 32a) maps the storage 
tanks and the maximum water run-up. Figure 33a) shows the storage tanks and the maximum 
water flow velocities, and figure 34a) shows the storage tanks and maximum loads. As indicated 
above, the western half of the refinery is subject to higher water run-up heights and higher water 
flow velocities than the eastern half. For this scenario maximum water loads appear uniform 
along the coast. However, loads near the shoreline are higher than further inland. Thus, the 
storage tanks closer to the shoreline (ID. 18, 120 and 121) would experience higher loads. 
 
6.3 Landslide-triggered tsunami 
As was described in section 3, recent research has demonstrated that the Stromboli Volcano has 
the potential to produce large catastrophic tsunamis and that its effects would be felt along the 
northern coast of Sicily (Tinti et al. 2003). Based on the initial tsunami conditions provided by 
the University of Bologna, a landslide-triggered tsunami at Stromboli was modelled. Figure 27 
shows the location and initial conditions of the landslide-triggered tsunami.  
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Stromboli 
Aeolian Archipelago 
Calabria
Sicily 
Figure 27. Initial conditions of the landslide-triggered tsunami at Stromboli input into the HyFlux2 
tsunami model. Note: Time = 0 for our tsunami modelling with HyFlux2. However, the input data used for 
the modelling represents the tsunami field at a time = 100 s after which it is reasonable to assume that the 
forcing due to the landslide is over and that what remains is the pure tsunami propagation. 
 
The results show that the modelled landslide at Stromboli would generate a large tsunami wave 
which propagates towards the south-eastern Tyrrhenian region affecting Calabria, the Aeolian 
archipelago, and northern Sicily. The first positive wave would impact the refinery after about 17 
minutes. The tsunami wave would approach northern Sicily from north to south, thus impacting 
the coastline at the refinery perpendicularly. The maximum wave height at the port terminals 
would be between 0.5-0.8 m above normal tide with about a 1.2-1.8 m differential between the 
wave crest and trough.  
The maximum calculated water surface level at the shoreline at the refinery would be lower than 
for the Capo Vaticano scenario, varying between 0.4m and 1.0m (see figure 28b). However, the 
maximum water flow velocity is generally higher,  varying between 1.0 m/s to about 4 m/s. Peak 
water flow velocities are higher in the area immediately to the west of the warehouse and pump 
station (see figure 29b). The distance to the sea of the maximum water run-up varies between 
about 80m to a little over 160m. The area between the two port terminals would be inundated the 
greatest distance inland (see figure 30b), experiencing also the highest maximum water run-up 
(see figure 31b). In general, and similar to the Capo Vaticano scenario, the western half of the 
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refinery would experience higher water run-up, between 1.20m - 1.60m, while the eastern half is 
subject to water run up heights of 0.8m - 1.0m.  
In this scenario there would also be eighteen storage tanks exposed to flooding. Storage tanks 
near the shoreline and the maximum water run-up are shown in Figure 32b. The storage tanks 
located on the western half of the refinery, particularly the area between the two port terminals 
are subject to higher run-up heights. The area beyond the eastern side of the refinery, where the 
power plant begins, would be subject to water run-up of about 1.4m.  
Figure 33b shows the storage tanks and the maximum water flow velocities. The areas subject to 
the highest run-up heights are also subject to the highest water flow velocities, as in the Capo 
Vaticano tsunami scenario. However, in this case, the highest water loads (hydrostatic + 
hydrodynamic) are not evenly distributed, but would be higher in the western half of the refinery 
and the eastern end beyond the refinery fence line (see Figure 34b). 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
In these two hypothetical, but probable, tsunami scenarios there could be up to 18 storage tanks 
affected by flooding. Both tsunami scenarios are consistent in that they indicate higher exposure 
to flooding of the western half of the refinery, and in particular the area between the two port 
terminals. Over all, the Stromboli tsunami produces slightly higher water flow velocities, while 
the Capo Vaticano tsunami results in greater water depths at the exposed tanks (see Table 1).  
In order to understand the potential impact of the modelled tsunami scenarios at the refinery the 
vulnerability of the exposed equipment needs to be assessed. However, there are only scarce 
simplified equipment damage models available in the literature to assess damage probabilities of 
industrial equipment due to tsunami impact or flooding. Campedel et al. (2008) have proposed 
flood vulnerability curves for industrial equipment. The equipment vulnerability curves were 
developed based on past flood events correlating different damage states for different types of 
industrial equipment (e.g., anchored and unanchored atmospheric storage tanks, pressure vessels) 
with the maximum water depth and the square of the water flow velocity. Thus, the computed 
maximum water depth and the maximum water flow velocities for both simulations were used to 
determine an equipment vulnerability index (ranging from 0 – low probability of damage to 5 –
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high probability of damage). The values were read off the vulnerability curves published by 
Campedel et al. (2008) which are presented in figure 35. The results are shown in table 1.  
 
a) 
 
 
 
b) 
Figure 28. Maximum water surface level (water run-up) at the shoreline of the refinery for a) Capo 
Vaticano and b) Stromboli tsunamis. The blue and green lines mark the location of the two port terminals. 
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a) 
b) 
 
Figure 29. Maximum water flow velocity at the shoreline of the refinery for a) Capo Vaticano and b) 
Stromboli tsunamis. The blue and green lines indicate the location of the two port terminals. 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure 30. Distance to the sea of the maximum water run-up along the refinery for a) Capo Vaticano and 
b) Stromboli tsunamis. The blue and green lines indicate the location of the two port terminals. 
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 a) 
 
 
b) 
Figure 31. Maximum water run-up along the refinery for a) Capo Vaticano and b) Stromboli tsunamis. 
The blue and green lines indicate the location of the two port terminals. 
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a) 
 
 
b) 
Figure 32. Map of storage tanks near the shoreline showing the maximum water run-up (maximum water 
surface level a.s.l.) for a) Capo Vaticano and b) Stromboli tsunamis. 
 
 37
a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b) 
 
Figure 33. Map of storage tanks near the shoreline showing the maximum water flow velocities for a) 
Capo Vaticano and b) Stromboli tsunamis. 
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a) 
 
b) 
Figure 34. Storage tanks near the shore and maximum loads (hydrostatic + hydrodynamic) for a) Capo 
Vaticano and b) Stromboli tsunamis. 
 
Because the equipment vulnerability curves produced by Campedel et al. were developed based 
on limited empirical data (mostly from riverine and hurricane related flood events), the values 
presented here provide only an indication of potential consequences, and should not be 
considered definitive. The vulnerability index is zero for almost all tanks for both tsunami 
scenarios. Based on empirical data, Campedel et al. note that an index = 0 indicates that there is a 
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0-5% probability of damage. Only two storage tanks, ID 120 and 121, have an index value of 1 
for the Stromboli tsunami, which translates to a probability of damage higher than 5%.  
 
Figure 35. Plot for the calculation of the equipment vulnerability in the case of floods. V2: square of 
water flow velocity; h: maximum water depth. The vulnerability zones indicate the equipment 
vulnerability index (0 - low probability to 5 - high probability) (Courtesy of Campedel et al. 2008). 
 
Water flow velocities are generally small for the Capo Vaticano scenario, but may reach values 
of 1 m/s or higher at some tanks for the Stromboli tsunami. According to Campedel et al. (2008), 
under slow submersion (water flow velocities < 1m/s) damage would be restricted to failure of 
flanges and connections mostly due to floating off of unanchored empty or almost empty storage 
tanks and attached appurtenances and pipelines.  
Campedel et al. (2008) summarized the following damage threshold limit values for structural 
damage with loss of containment and with consequent release of hazardous materials: 
• High water level condition: water level, h > 1 m and minimum velocity, v, required 
v=0.25 m/s  
• High flow condition: v > 2 m/s and h=0.5 m    
• High risk condition: h ≥ 1 m and v ≥ 1 m/s 
Under high water level conditions and low water velocity buoyant loads are mostly responsible 
for any damage and consequent release of hazardous materials. Thus, an estimate of the forces 
exerted on each tank by the flood waters, and the resulting buoyant force was estimated assuming 
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that the flood waters have overtopped the concrete containment walls around tanks. It is 
important to point out that while these barriers serve the purpose of retaining accidental releases 
from the tanks, they have not been designed to keep flood waters out. It could be assumed that 
they would provide some level of flood protection to the individual tanks as long as the walls are 
not damaged or overtopped. Tanks on the far eastern side of the refinery have earthen 
containment walls. These we believe would provide sufficient protection against flood damage. 
Thus the estimates provided here are conservative. The ratio, r, of the buoyant force to the weight 
(fmaxZ/Wv) of the tank has been calculated for both tsunami conditions. The results are shown in 
table 2.  
Empty tanks with an r > 1 could float off if not properly anchored. Table 2 also provides 
information about each storage tank indicating the type of tank, tank diameter (D), height (H), 
tank shell thickness (t), the weight of the tank (Wv), the maximum2 water depth, the resulting 
maximum force from the x and y directions (fmaxXY) and the resulting maximum buoyant force 
(fmaxZ) at each tank for each tsunami scenario. 
In both scenarios, some damage to empty or almost empty storage tanks could occur if these are 
not properly anchored to overcome buoyancy loads (at those tanks where r > 1) in the case that 
concrete containment walls are overtopped or damaged. Buoyancy loads could also affect low 
lying pipelines, particularly those located at the pump station which lie only 10-20 meters from 
the shoreline where water depths are greater than 1 m. Floating off of pipelines could result in 
pipeline breaks and consequent release of hazardous materials if these are in operation or if they 
have not been properly de-inventoried before the tsunami.  
Flood waters run inland as far as 140 m in both scenarios. Thus, inundation is likely to result in 
salt-water intrusion on low-lying equipment such as pumps and motors, electrical panels, and 
electronic control equipment, particularly at and near the pump station and warehouse, as well as 
at the western half of the refinery where water depths are greater. Damage to electric and/or 
electronic control equipment could result in process upsets and possible accidental releases of 
hazardous materials. The inundation may furthermore overcome the internal plant drainage 
                                                 
2 The maximum is evaluated by considering the values at each tank at each time step. Values of hmax, vmax, fmaxZ 
at each time step are an average of the pixel data around the tank, while values of  fmaxXY at each time step are an 
integral of the normal component to the tank surface of the forces in the pixels around the tank. 
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system, possibly causing waste oil to be lifted by the floodwaters which may spark fires and 
explosions upon contact with an ignition source (e.g hot refinery parts). 
Water flow velocities reach 3-4 m/s at the shoreline just to the west of the pump station and 
warehouse in both scenarios. Any debris (e.g., drift wood, small boats, lumber) being transported 
by the tsunami wave in this area close to the shoreline could result in damage to the refinery 
fence-line along the beach front, and if it were overturned or overtopped (easily overturned by 
large debris as the fence is made of thin wire), possibly to building structures, storage containers, 
pipelines or other exposed elements in this area.  
Debris impact can be the dominant cause for building damage (Yeh et al. 2005). However, it is 
difficult to estimate debris loads accurately. In general debris load are a function of the weight of 
the waterborne object and its velocity, and inversely related to the duration of impact. 
Furthermore, the impact loads are influenced by where a building or exposed element is located 
in the potential debris stream (FEMA 2006):  
• Immediately adjacent to or downstream from another building  
• Downstream from large floatable objects (e.g., exposed or minimally covered storage 
tanks)  
• Among closely spaced buildings 
Several equations have been proposed to estimate debris impact loads (Matsutomi 1999, Haehnel 
and Daly 2002, ASCE 2003, FEMA 2002, FEMA 2006). A detailed discussion of the topic is, 
however, beyond the scope of this work.  
In the Stromboli scenario, high water flow velocities (2-4 m/s) and water depths > 1m, combined 
with possible turbulence near the shoreline could result in soil erosion and localized scour 
particularly around the area just to the west of the warehouse and pump station, up to the second 
port terminal, and at the far eastern side of the refinery where some soil erosion and scouring is 
already present; although in the latter case no damage to the refinery would be expected. The 
refinery fence-line support wall could also be subject to scouring in this area. Weakening of the 
support wall would increase the likelihood of the fence-line being overturned. 
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Table 1. Tank flood vulnerability index (index) for the Capo Vaticano and Stromboli tsunamis. Also 
shown are maximum water depth (hmax) (maximum water run-up height minus the digital elevation), 
maximum velocity (vmax), and the square of vmax used to read the flood vulnerability index (from 0 –
none to low likelihood of damage to 5 – high likelihood of damage) from the equipment vulnerability 
curves published by Campedel et al. (2008). 
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Table 2. Ratio of buoyant force to weight of tank indicating buoyancy of empty tanks for the Capo 
Vaticano and Stromboli tsunamis. In addition to the ratio, the table columns show the tank identification 
number (ID), tank type, diameter (D), height (H), tank wall thickness (t), tank weight (Wv), maximum 
force component in the X and Y direction (fmaxXY), and maximum force component in the Z direction 
(fmaxZ) (buoyant force). 
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In general, erosion and localized scour can aggravate the effects of flooding by lowering the 
ground surface around foundations leading to loss of load-bearing capacity and resistance to 
lateral and buoyant loads. Erosion and scour could also increase flood depths and, therefore, 
increase depth dependent flood loads (FEMA 2006). Localized scour determinations require 
detailed knowledge of the water depth, flow velocity, soil characteristics, and foundation type 
(FEMA 2006). Much of the evidence gathered suggests that localized scour depths around piles 
and other thin vertical members are approximately equal to 1.0 to 1.5 times the pile diameter 
(FEMA 2006). Overall, erosion and scour would most likely not represent a large threat to 
storage tanks at the refinery, but would mainly undermine protection barriers such as the natural 
protection barrier (figures 14 and 15), and the refinery fence-line that could serve to filter small 
debris, as well as a some equipment foundations near the shoreline (figures 15 and 16).   
The above analysis indicates that the likelihood of major hazardous materials releases from 
damage to storage tanks is low. However, small leaks from damaged flange connections and 
broken pipelines due to floating off of empty or almost empty storage tanks are possible in both 
tsunami scenarios. Damage from debris impact, erosion and scour appears not to be a major issue 
in terms of potential releases, or at least not as a direct result.  
Hazardous materials releases in the form of oil spills could result from broken loading/unloading 
arms and pipeline breaks at the port terminals, particularly during the Capo Vaticano tsunami. 
Since the Capo Vaticano tsunami impacts the coastline laterally, the two port terminals would 
receive the wave impact perpendicularly. Thus, any ships docked on the east side of the port 
terminals could have a forcing effect on the pier structures and could cause some damage while a 
ship moored on the west side would be pushed away from the pier possibly tearing pipe 
connections and leading to oil spills. Spills from loading and unloading arms at jetties following 
tsunamis have been documented. In fact an oil spill at this refinery was observed following the 
Stromboli tsunami of December 2002. Two oil tankers moored at the wharfs were at risk of 
having their mooring lines broken. The tankers moved away about 10m. A small oil spill was 
reported as a result of the single tsunami wave observed (Maramai et al. 2005). It is not clear if 
the spill was caused because the moored tankers were still in the process of (un)loading or if 
transfer was stopped but they were still connected to the wharf via the transfer arms. Steinberg 
and Cruz (2004) reported hazardous materials releases at the jetty of an oil refinery in Turkey 
following a tsunami triggered by the Kocaeli earthquake of August 1999. The authors write:  
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At the refinery’s port terminal, which partially collapsed, a ship at the loading/unloading naphtha 
terminal tore loose during the earthquake- triggered tsunami, breaking pipe connections and causing 
a leakage of 50 tons of naphtha directly into the sea. In addition, approximately 35 tons of LPG were 
released at the jetty during the tsunami when an LPG loading/unloading arm broke. 
 
8. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
The consequences of potential hazardous materials releases, fires or explosions triggered by any 
of the two tsunamis on nearby residents and neighbouring facilities are likely to be negligible 
because the amounts of chemical that might be released are expected to be small. Nonetheless, 
even small amounts of oil can form a thin film over flood waters and can be dispersed and 
transported quickly throughout large areas. Any damage in this case will be restricted to coating 
of surfaces with oil; although oil spills have been reported to disperse completely leaving almost 
no trace. This would be the case if high turbulence occurs; for example during the Indian Ocean 
tsunami (Van Dijk 2007). If floating oil catches fire (e.g., due to contact with very hot surfaces or 
other ignition source), the fire could be spread over large areas very quickly. In this case the 
refinery itself and its workers would be at risk.  
Releases of flammable gases such as LPG due to damaged flanges or broken pipe connections 
may occur. In the case of LPG the port terminals are particularly vulnerable. Any release could 
lead to the formation of a vapour cloud and possibly vapour cloud explosion (VCE). According 
to an accident scenario taken from Giardina (2000) involving a break of the transfer and the 
resulting overpressure nearby residents would probably not be affected unless the vapour cloud is 
carried far enough as the nearest residences are more than 700 m away. An explosion however 
could cause damage to the port terminals and other ships, as well as trigger domino effects.  
 
9. TSUNAMI RISK REDUCTION MEASURES 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that engineered structures in coastal regions exposed to 
tsunami (or storm-surge) inundation can be subject to a variety of concomitant damaging 
phenomena (Rossetto 2007, Robertson 2007). These include uplifting due to submersion of 
structures, overturning and displacement due to wave loading, debris impact, or foundation 
failure caused by liquefaction-induced scour in sandy subsurface deposits. The impact of a 
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tsunami on a low-lying coastal industrial area could therefore result in damage to or collapse of 
industrial buildings, tanks and other equipment storing or processing hazardous materials and 
consequently to a Natech accident with the release of dangerous chemicals and potentially 
devastating consequences on the population and the environment. Since tsunami inundation 
usually affects a wide swath of land the risk of a domino effect3 in a densely industrialised area is 
elevated. Industrial facilities need to prepare for such an event, and measures to prevent a 
tsunami-triggered Natech accident and/or to mitigate its consequences need to be put into place to 
ensure effective risk reduction. 
  
Land-use planning is the obvious way to avoid the impact of a tsunami, and limiting industrial 
development along tsunami-prone coasts minimises the hazard associated with the inundation. 
Land-use restrictions are, however, difficult to impose as many hazardous areas are already 
heavily industrialised and it may be decided to accept certain risks from infrequently occurring 
hazards as long as they do not outweigh the benefits derived from an industrial activity. In this 
case supplementary measures are required to protect hazardous facilities. This means that static 
and hydrodynamic wave action on structures, as well as on the protective measures needs to be 
considered during the design and operation of an industrial plant. 
 
Tsunami protection measures such as offshore breakwalls or other types of external barriers 
onshore have proven to be efficient in reducing the tsunami force (Ergin 2006, Jayappa 2008, 
Maheshwari). Experience from storm-surge mitigation after Hurricane Katrina also highlights the 
potential of barriers for flood protection, such as earthen berms, sheet-pile walls, or concrete 
foundation and walls (Harris 2008). These barriers could also keep tsunami-driven debris from 
washing into the plant where collision of debris with tanks or equipment containing hazardous 
materials could lead to releases of toxic, flammable or explosive substances. The studied refinery 
does not have any breakwalls leaving the two port terminals fully exposed to potential tsunami 
wave action. In the eastern part of the refinery there is a stretch of earthen barrier that would 
                                                 
3 For the purpose of this work and in accordance with the Seveso Directive a scenario where a chemical accident in 
one industrial establishment triggers an accident in one or more neighbouring facilities off-site is called domino 
effect (European Union 1997). In the chemical-engineering community domino effect can also refer to an accident 
triggering other accidents within the same establishment. 
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protect any piping and equipment lying behind it from the full force of the incoming waves. It 
does, however, not run along the full length of the refinery and would therefore provide little 
protection from inundation. 
 
In the absence of external barriers all structures and components that contain hazardous materials 
and all systems critical for the safety of the installation need to be protected from wave-load 
damage and water intrusion. This can be achieved by e.g. the creation of artificial hills on which 
to situate sensitive equipment or the installation of retaining dikes, as well as waterproofing and 
appropriate design of safety systems. Water entering buildings and other structures will cause 
anything that is not properly anchored to float, thereby increasing the debris load that can cause 
further damage. Of particular concern are storage tanks that may float off their foundations due to 
submersion and subsequent buoyancy, thereby tearing pipe connections and resulting in the 
release of possibly flammable and/or toxic materials. These materials would then be dispersed by 
the floodwaters over vast areas and possibly catch fire upon contact with an ignition source. 
Adequately designed anchoring with bolts or other types of restraint systems should keep tanks 
and other equipment from floating off under most conditions. As an additional protection 
measure a minimum quantity of material could be stored in these tanks at all times to ensure that 
they would not suffer buoyancy in the case of flooding. Since it was not possible to visit the 
studied refinery we could not determine the type of anchoring or restraint systems utilised on-site. 
We noticed, however, earthen containment dikes and brick or concrete walls around the storage 
tanks visible from the plant’s perimeter. While these barriers serve the purpose of retaining 
accidental releases from the tanks rather than keeping flood waters out, it can be assumed that 
they would provide some level of flood protection to the individual tanks as long as the walls are 
not overtopped.  
 
It is also necessary to assess the potential of soil for liquefaction-induced scour as it may result in 
foundation failures and damage to or collapse of engineered structures. Therefore, the siting of 
tanks and equipment on soil that is susceptible to liquefaction and scouring should be avoided. If 
this is not feasible foundations need to be reinforced and remedial action needs to be taken to 
stabilise the soil, e.g. using methods such as jet grouting, vibroflotation, etc.  
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 Tsunami monitoring and warning systems can allow sufficient lead time for preventive measures 
to be taken to reduce exposure or vulnerability of equipment and processes. Emergency shutdown 
of processes that depend on pumps, motors or materials located in areas close to the shoreline 
would reduce their vulnerability to process upset due to flooding, short circuit, power outages, etc. 
that might be triggered by the tsunami. Warning would also provide some time, if adequate 
emergency procedures are established beforehand, to move materials and portable equipment out 
of harms way to avoid water damage or water intrusion, or to secure any objects, equipment, etc. 
that could become water borne and inflict debris damage on other equipment. In the case of the 
refinery studied in this work warning times would be rather short. Our calculations indicate that 
the first wave would arrive at the refinery after 17 minutes in the Stromboli scenario while it 
would take 27 minutes for the first wave to arrive from Capo Vaticano. The warning lead time is 
therefore only sufficient for emergency shutdown and possibly securing of loose objects and 
portable equipment if the refinery has planned for such an event. The same applies to tankers 
moored at the refinery’s two oil terminals that would be exposed to the full wave impact. After a 
tsunami warning with a lead time of a few hours moored tankers would ordinarily cease loading 
or unloading and move into deep water to reduce the risk of a major oil spill (Eskijian 2006). 
Since in our study the tsunami is generated in the near field with the corresponding short warning 
times there would not be sufficient time to move the tankers. They could only terminate the 
transfer, disconnect hoses and wait for the waves to hit. As already indicated before of the two 
scenarios modelled in this study a tsunami created by the Capo Vaticano fault would probably be 
of higher concern for the oil terminals as the incoming tsunami waves would hit laterally. Any 
tanker moored at the terminals would not only suffer vertical but possibly also significant lateral 
displacement. This highlights the importance of stopping transfer and disconnecting the loading 
arms to minimise the risk of an oil spill during a tsunami.  
 
In order for the above measures to effectively prevent damage and hazardous-materials releases 
by a tsunami it is important that affected structures are able to withstand the ground motion of a 
possibly preceding earthquake with limited structural damage. This is applicable to both shore 
protection systems and industrial facilities which when weakened would have less resistance to 
an impacting tsunami wave. Moreover, releases from tanks and pipes triggered by the earthquake 
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would be spread by the incoming flood waters, possibly exacerbating the consequences of the 
event. An analysis of empirical damage data at the MMI levels to be expected at the study area 
from the modelled earthquake in the Capo Vaticano fault shows that the likelihood for anything 
more than light earthquake damage in the refinery is low.  
 
The discussed structural tsunami risk reduction measures need to be supported by organisational 
measures to be effective in minimising the risk of a tsunami impact on a chemical facility. This 
includes the drawing up of a tsunami hazard management plan both at plant and community level 
that incorporates organisational tsunami response procedures and the emergency evacuation of 
workers and residents in view of possible inundation, as well as hazardous-materials triggered by 
it. Moreover, compliance with building codes that limit land use and building construction 
practices needs to be monitored. Where necessary the lawmaker is called upon to intervene with 
targeted legislation to ensure a high level of safety in and around hazardous facilities with respect 
to a possible tsunami impact. 
 
10. STUDY LIMITATIONS  
This study has provided valuable information on the potential impact of two credible tsunami 
scenarios on an oil refinery in northern Sicily. Nevertheless, the study has a number of limitations 
which are due to the assumptions made and the uncertainties in the input data (such as e.g. DEM, 
bathymetry, refinery schematics, etc.), as well as in the tsunami propagation and inundation 
model used. 
The source data for the tsunami simulations for both scenarios provided by the University of 
Bologna, is based on simulations using historical data. While these results are certainly subject to 
parameter and modeling uncertainties we assume them to be negligible. The uncertainty in the 
utilized model for simulating the tsunami propagation and inundation, HyFlux2, derives from the 
fact that it is a 2D model, and it is therefore unable to capture small 3D wave effects, such as 
turbulence on the beach. However, the model has been tested against experimental tsunami wave 
run-up output showing satisfactory results (Franchello 2009). 
The most important limitation concerns the accuracy of the bathymetry and DEM data used in the 
simulations. In the open sea a bathymetry of 1 km x 1km resolution was used, and in the near 
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field vector data corresponding to isolines for the refinery area were input. The DEM data 
resolution was 100m x 100m, and vector data corresponding to isolines assuming a constant 
upward slope from the shoreline (0 m) to the railroad tracks that cross the refinery were used. As 
was discussed in section 6.1.1 the DEM data accurately predicts the elevations near the rail road 
tracks but is less accurate in representing elevations near the shoreline. Thus, uncertainty results 
in the modelled tsunami run-up heights. The present study results could be improved by using 
very fine grid size bathymetry and DEM data at the refinery, and re-running the simulation model 
with a very fine grid size in the run-up zone. Even very small changes in local bathymetry and the 
slope at the beach can result in very different effects at the shoreline within short distances. These 
inaccuracies in the bathymetry and DEM data will undoubtedly result in uncertainty in the 
observed effects from the two tsunami scenarios on the refinery.  
In fact, uncertainty in the DEM data, and the assumption of a constant slope introduces an error 
in the estimation of tsunami loads which uses the computed water depth at each tank. Due to the 
constant slope assumption, the maximum water depth around a tank will vary depending on 
which part of the tank is being considered as the tank diameters are relatively large ranging from 
25-80 m. For example, in the Capo Vaticano scenario, tank ID 18 (D=55 m) is subject to 0.85 m 
inundation on the north side (closer to the shoreline) and to 0.25m on the south side (farthest 
from the shoreline). Nonetheless, it is correct to assume that the tanks are on completely 
horizontal support foundations and that the water depth for a submerged tank at any point of the 
tank should be the same.  
Finally, there is uncertainty in the present study due to uncertainty concerning the exposed 
elements (location, dimensions, distances, etc.) at the refinery such as storage tanks, pipelines, 
processing equipment, building structures, and other plant features. Estimates on equipment 
distribution and storage tank dimensions were based on an outdated floor plan of the refinery, 
corroborated by a satellite image from Google Earth and data from the refinery’s website. An 
accurate floor plan of the refinery including accurate DEM data at each tank and major process 
equipment would provide more reliable results on the vulnerability assessment. 
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11. CONCLUSIONS 
In this report we have presented the results of a study which analyzes the potential impacts of two 
tsunami scenarios originating in the Tyrrhenian Sea and their consequences at an industrial 
facility located on the coast in north-eastern Sicily. The results of the tsunami simulations 
indicate that in both scenarios there would be 18 storage tanks at the industrial facility subject to 
flooding, with tanks closer to the beach suffering up to 0.8 m inundation.  
The above results indicate that there is low likelihood of damage to storage tanks due to 
hydrodynamic loads in either scenario. Water flow velocities in most areas are less than 1 m/s. 
This indicates that any damage would likely occur due to hydrostatic uplift forces due to 
buoyancy particularly in the western part of the facility where inundation levels are higher and 
storage tanks are less protected. Nevertheless, storage tanks in this part of the refinery do have 
concrete containment dikes and these may provide some flood protection. Thus, damage due to 
buoyancy loads would occur only if the containment dikes are damaged by flood waters or if they 
are overtopped.  
Damage due to impact of floating debris may be a problem particularly to the west of the pump 
station and warehouse in both scenarios where water flow velocities reach 3-4 m/s. Any debris 
being transported by the tsunami wave in this area could result in some damage to building 
structures, storage containers, pipelines or other exposed elements. Foundation soils and 
foundation systems could also be at risk from shear- and liquefaction-induced scour in this 
section of the plant. 
The refinery port terminals would be at risk of tsunami wave damage, particularly during the 
Capo Vaticano tsunami because the wave would impact the piers perpendicularly. Thus, any 
ships docked at the port terminals could have a forcing effect on the pier structures possibly 
causing some damage. Furthermore, ships moored on the west side would be pushed away from 
the pier possibly tearing pipe connections and leading to oil spills.  
The likelihood of hazardous materials releases from inundated storage tanks is low. However, 
small releases could occur due to breakage of connected pipelines and flanges due to buoyancy 
loads. Flooding of electrical equipment, such as control panels, pumps, and motors, not raised 
above the inundation level could result in salt water intrusion leading to possible short circuit, 
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hampering of safety and mitigation systems, process upsets and possible hazardous materials 
releases.  
We conclude however that in the two scenarios studied, the consequences of potential hazardous 
materials releases, fires or explosions triggered by the tsunamis on nearby residents and 
neighbouring facilities are likely to be small. Nonetheless, small changes in the accuracy of the 
data used in the simulations, particularly bathymetry and DEM could result in higher or lower 
inundation values than those obtained for the present study. Thus, we recommend that preventive 
and preparedness measures be taken to reduce the risk of tsunami-triggered Natech accidents and 
to mitigate their consequences if Natech events do occur.  
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